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ABSTRACT
It is sometimes argued that foreign aid leads to a virtuous circle in which growth
becomes self-reinforcing. We study two versions of this argument, using a modified
neoclassical growth model in which the effects of parameter changes and capital ac-
cumulation are amplified. Simulations are used to quantify the welfare benefits from
aid transfers. We find that, contrary to expectations, amplification makes only a
modest difference to the welfare benefits from aid. This is true even when aid allows
a faster exit from a vicious circle or poverty trap.
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Everything is obvious — once you know the answer
— Title of book by Duncan Watts
1 Introduction
The Harvard commencement address of 5 June 1947 was given by the Secretary of
State, George Marshall. His speech was less than thirteen minutes long, but was
hailed by one foreign minister as ‘one of the greatest speeches in world history’.1 In
the speech, Marshall set out a clear vision for the problems facing postwar Europe,
and how aid could be used to address them. He was optimistic about what large-
scale aid could achieve: ‘The remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring
the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries’.
The Marshall Plan is often seen as the first major aid programme, and perhaps
the most successful. The objective sketched by Marshall, that aid could break a
vicious circle, echoed the ideas of Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) a few years earlier. And
as development economics began to take shape in the 1950s, vicious circles and
coordination failures were widely discussed. They were central to the visions of
Singer (1949) and Nurkse (1953), and discussed extensively in Hirschman (1958).
Lewis (1955, chapter V) stressed the interdependence of capital investments. These
early writers tended to see underdevelopment as representing one or more coordin-
ation failures, and emphasized that some conditions of poor countries would be
self-perpetuating.
A related view suggested that, if only growth could be initiated, it would quickly
become self-reinforcing. The metaphor of a ‘take-off’ into sustained growth became
popular, with its implication that getting off the ground is harder than staying in
the air. There are many possible mechanisms through which growth could promote
further growth. In the recent literature, it has become common to emphasize polit-
ical economy forces, as in Krueger (1993), Besley and Persson (2011) and Acemoglu
and Robinson (2012), in which good political outcomes promote good economic
outcomes, and vice versa.
It is clear that these ideas have a long history, and that virtuous and vicious
circles are widely regarded as important. Yet this also suggests a puzzle. Although
global spending on foreign aid is more important than ever before, and currently ex-
ceeds $150 billion each year, economists studying foreign aid have rarely investigated
the quantitative implications of virtuous circles, or exit from vicious circles. The
true importance of virtuous circles remains unknown, and it is not easy to establish
1The minister was the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, quoted in Judt (2005), p. 91.
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their existence in the cross-country data. The regressions common in the literature
are not always well-suited to capturing such ideas, or the broader notion that aid
can be a catalyst for successful development.
In this paper, we take a different approach. We consider two extensions to the
neoclassical growth model, and study their quantitative implications using simu-
lations. In the first extension, capital accumulation is amplified by an external-
ity. Perhaps unexpectedly, for reasons we explain below, this mechanism does not
strengthen a welfare-based case for aid. In the second extension, we study an eco-
nomy temporarily trapped in a vicious circle of low income, low saving and low
investment. In this case, an economy needs to achieve ‘escape velocity’ or take-off,
generating a virtuous circle in which development leads to higher investment. Our
results indicate that, if aid allows a faster exit from a medium-run poverty trap, the
benefits of aid are significant, but still modest relative to international differences in
consumption per capita. This is true even if the growth process can take advantage
of an externality to capital.
These results are developed using simple modifications to the Ramsey model.
Although the model is stylized, it helps to isolate some of the dilemmas that aid
donors have to resolve. In models of this type, donors could decide to prioritize
(1) the countries with the best growth prospects; (2) those where aid can do the
most to improve growth prospects; (3) those most in need of higher consumption;
or (4) those where aid can do the most to improve consumption prospects. It is
often argued that aid should be given to countries with good institutions, but these
countries may be destined for fast growth in any case; hence countries in category
(1) are less in need of aid, and should be a lower priority, other things equal. The
orthodox justifications for aid tend to emphasize category (2): aid should be directed
to where it can do the most to improve growth prospects. The neoclassical growth
model, with an explicit objective function based on the time profile of consumption,
naturally suggests that considerations (3) and (4) will also be important. We show
that this perspective can overturn or qualify some standard intuitions about the
relevance of virtuous circles and medium-run poverty traps for donor decisions.
To avoid misunderstandings, we emphasize that the paper is not about the over-
all role of virtuous circles in the growth process. Taking a long view, the sustained
divergence in national economic fortunes that began in the nineteenth century sug-
gests that virtuous circles could matter. Our paper is focused on a narrower question,
which is whether the idea can be used to strengthen the case for aid. It might seem
that donors can take advantage of virtuous circles; but so can other sources of in-
vestment, such as domestic saving, in which case the development path of an aid
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recipient will not greatly differ from the path without aid.
In the models we consider, aid does generate significant welfare gains. But the
gains look modest when set against the potential benefits of higher total factor
productivity (TFP) in poorer countries, given the findings of the development ac-
counting literature, reviewed in Caselli (2005) and Hsieh and Klenow (2010). Even
in models with virtuous or vicious circles, the welfare benefits from a realistic level
of aid are an order of magnitude smaller than the benefits from eliminating TFP
differences. These results suggest that it would be interesting to study models and
policies in which aid has a direct effect on productivity, including models in which
the effects of productivity changes are amplified by virtuous circles. It would also
be interesting to quantify the effects of aid in models based on coordination failures.
However, we treat those endeavors as beyond the scope of the paper.
The rest of the paper expands on these arguments as follows. In the next section,
we briefly define amplification effects and vicious circles, and discuss the previous
literature. Section 3 describes a modified version of the neoclassical growth model.
Section 4 presents the simulation assumptions and some results. Section 5 introduces
subsistence consumption, so that aid can be used to escape a medium-run poverty
trap. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Discussion
The role of vicious and virtuous circles is a theme as old as development economics
itself. Work in the 1950s often discussed the ‘vicious circle of poverty’, and the
concept features heavily in a World Bank retrospective on development econom-
ics, Meier and Seers (1984). The early work emphasized the need for coordinated
investment, and the role of low income as a constraint on investment. The text-
book by Basu (1997, chapter 2) reviews some relevant contributions, but the range
of potential mechanisms extends beyond those that have been formalized. Rostow
(1956) was one of the first to discuss self-reinforcing growth and the wide range of
candidate mechanisms.
Recent discussions of virtuous circles have emphasized mechanisms related to
political economy and governance, treating these as endogenous. For example,
Krueger (1993) discusses how trade policies and politics could interact to gener-
ate either vicious or virtuous circles. Bräutigam and Knack (2004, p. 259) argue
that ‘once governance begins to decline, a vicious cycle of inadequate revenues, low
morale, and poor performance is all too easily created’.2 Besley and Persson (2011)
2Sachs (2006) sketches a virtuous circle in which rising tax revenues strengthen political au-
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highlight the possibility that investment in state capacity and political stability
could be mutually reinforcing. In an extended discussion, Acemoglu and Robinson
(2012, chapter 11) set out several mechanisms, including the interaction of the rule
of law and political pluralism; positive feedback between inclusive political institu-
tions and inclusive economic institutions; and the role of a free press in maintaining
inclusive institutions.
Despite the appeal of these ideas, there have been few examples of ‘quantitative
theory’. Yet quantification seems needed, and can work against standard intuitions.
To demonstrate this, we build on a tradition that analyzes aid in neoclassical growth
models. Obstfeld (1999) used simulations of a model with endogenous saving to
conclude that the effects of aid on consumption and output are relatively modest.
Rajan and Subramanian (2008), using a growth model with exogenous saving, also
found the effects to be modest.3
We combine amplification effects and virtuous circles with another long-standing
argument: aid may be most effective where it is least needed. Informal versions of
this idea go back to Friedman (1958) and Bauer (1969, 1971), who both questioned
whether aid would usefully increase investment. They argued that, if the condi-
tions for successful capital accumulation were in place, it would already have been
accumulated. Versions of this idea are discussed by Eaton (1989), Temple (2010),
Deaton (2013), and Carter (2014), among others. Carter (2014) studies its relev-
ance in the neoclassical growth model. Although it seems natural to target aid at
the countries where aid will have the largest effect on investment and growth, these
may be precisely the countries which are destined to prosper even in the absence
of aid. If the donor’s decision problem is analyzed in welfare terms, a different set
of countries may be identified as priorities — not those where aid does the most to
raise growth, but where aid has the largest benefits for the lifetime utility derived
from the entire consumption path, relative to a zero-aid benchmark.
Our emphasis on this point has a close precedent in the study of capital mobility
by Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006). Using simulations of neoclassical growth models,
they showed that, although foreign capital inflows bring capital accumulation and
growth forward in time, the associated welfare benefits are surprisingly modest.
This is because the economy would converge to its steady-state growth path even
in the absence of capital inflows. One contribution of our paper is to show that
thority and public investment, which support further increases in revenues.
3They argued that this may explain why aid has muted growth effects in cross-country re-
gressions. In related work with endogenous saving, some authors have allowed aid to finance
public investment, as in Chatterjee, Sakoulis and Turnovsky (2003) and other work summarized
in Turnovsky (2009).
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similar ideas can be applied to foreign aid, even when aid is amplified by a capital
externality or helps a recipient country to escape from a medium-run poverty trap.4
We now discuss amplification effects and virtuous circles in more detail. An ex-
ample of amplification is that, for a given capital-output ratio, the long-run elasti-
city of output with respect to TFP is greater than unity in the Solow and Ramsey
models.5 Since the equilibrium capital-output ratio is pinned down by structural
parameters, improvements in TFP lead to higher capital per worker, and this amp-
lifies their effect. The extent to which the TFP change is amplified is increasing in
the output-capital elasticity.
In this example, amplification arises due to endogenous changes in capital in-
tensity, and the long-run elasticity of output to TFP is larger than the short-run
elasticity implied by the production technology. This suggests a more general defini-
tion of amplification effects. The responsiveness of long-run equilibrium outcomes to
a given change — perhaps a change in TFP, or in policy variables — can sometimes
be attributed to one or more distinct mechanisms, involving one or more interven-
ing variables. When a specific mechanism leads to larger equilibrium responses in
one or more outcomes, we call this an amplification effect.6 Often, the strength of
the mechanism could vary, indexed by one or more parameters, and for some para-
meter values it could be absent altogether. To give a concrete example, our first
quantitative exercise will consider a Ramsey model with a capital externality.
Within this class of effects, virtuous circles form a special case. Virtuous circles
are usually thought of as unfolding over time, as part of a dynamic process in
which the movements of two or more variables reinforce each other. In the growth
case, we can think of the level of GDP per capita interacting with an additional
state variable, such as institutional quality, human capital, or financial development.
Growth leads to a change in this additional variable which promotes further growth.
In our terminology, virtuous circles will typically lead to amplification, but not
all amplification relies on virtuous circles. For example, externalities can generate
amplification without requiring that two or more variables reinforce each other.
A genuine virtuous circle arises in Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). The intro-
duction of human capital leads the elasticity of steady-state output with respect to
the investment rate to be higher than in the standard Solow model.7 In a related pa-
4The implications of the Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) analysis for the study of foreign aid
were previously discussed in Temple (2010) and Carter, Postel-Vinay and Temple (2015).
5A version of this point has been emphasized by Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997) and
Parente and Prescott (2000), among others.
6Note that our use of the term differs from that in Dutta, Leeson and Williamson (2013), who
consider the possibility that aid leads to a polarization in political institutions.
7Acemoglu (2009, p. 370) briefly discusses the use of the Mankiw et al. production function
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per that deserves to be better known, DeLong (1997) considers several mechanisms,
such as a relative price of equipment that is endogenous to the level of development.
Perry and others (2006) argue that poverty alleviation and growth are mutually
supportive: reductions in poverty make it easier for the poor to invest, spurring
further growth and poverty alleviation. Using firm-level data from Vietnam, Bai
and others (2014) find that fast-growing firms see reductions in the share of their
revenues extracted as bribes, suggesting that growth can alleviate corruption.8 More
generally, the list of candidate mechanisms for self-reinforcing growth may not be
much shorter than the list of candidate growth determinants.
In contrast to our approach, some discussions of virtuous circles see them as
tightly connected to multiple equilibria. Fast growth can arise in moving from one
equilibrium to another, and this may involve dynamic adjustments which reinforce
one another. From a policy perspective, however, a theory of equilibrium selection
is needed, which seems more fundamental than whether or not a virtuous circle
influences adjustment.9 Growth can be self-reinforcing even when the equilibrium is
unique, and amplification effects and virtuous circles seem worthy of study in their
own right, independently of poverty traps or multiple equilibria.
Nevertheless, we will draw on the poverty trap perspective. When underdevel-
opment is conceived as a self-reinforcing vicious circle, the prospects for escape may
depend on whether a virtuous circle is possible. This perspective helps to explain
the longevity of Rostow’s (1960) metaphor of take-off into ‘self-sustained’ growth.
In our later analysis, we consider a medium-run poverty trap generated by a subsist-
ence consumption constraint. Aid, by making available extra resources that can be
used for investment, allows a faster escape from the poverty trap, especially when
amplified by a capital externality.
3 The model
To study an amplification effect, we adapt an otherwise standard Ramsey model to
include ‘institutional quality’, which is treated as endogenous to GDP per capita.
in a Ramsey model with investment taxes; the aggregate consequences of tax distortions are then
amplified. Endogenous investments in human capital are also present in the models of Erosa,
Koreshkova and Restuccia (2010) and Manuelli and Seshadri (2014).
8Voors, Bulte and Damania (2011) find that positive income shocks in corrupt countries can
raise corruption, but a virtuous circle can arise when corruption is low.
9Acemoglu (2009, p. 116) draws a distinction between models with multiple equilibria, and
models with multiple steady-states. In the former case, the equilibrium can change when agents
simultaneously change behaviour or expectations, giving rise to indeterminacy; in the latter case,
the equilibrium path and the final outcome are determined by initial conditions. See Mourmouras
and Rangazas (2007) for analysis of aid in a model of the latter type.
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In the model, households do not internalize the effects of their investment decisions
on institutional quality, and hence invest too little from society’s point of view. But
for the aims of this paper, we are not primarily interested in the externality, or in
deviations from a social planning solution. Instead, we examine how the externality
influences the welfare benefits of aid.
The key point driving our results is that there are two opposing effects. The first
effect is the obvious one: the externality enhances the productivity gains associated
with investment, which makes aid-funded investment more valuable, and increases
the prospects for aid-funded growth. The second effect is less well understood.
Relative to an economy without an externality, an economy with an amplification
effect is destined to grow rapidly in any case. This implies strong consumption
prospects even in the absence of aid. In quantitative terms, this second effect can
easily dominate the first. When this happens, the welfare gains associated with aid
are more important in a world without amplification, contrary to standard intuitions.
We show this using a model that is stylized, but we do not need a more complicated
model to make our main points. As Paul Klee said of visual art, the aim is not to
reproduce reality, but to make something visible.
We consider a world with a single homogeneous good, and focus on a small aid
recipient that receives exogenous transfers, shared equally among identical private
households. There are no other international capital flows. We treat the labor force
as equal to the population. Relative to the standard Ramsey model, we introduce
a productive role for institutional quality Q at the aggregate level. We also assume
that institutional quality is itself a function of output per capita: more precisely, Q
has an elasticity with respect to output per capita of θ where θ < 1. This structure
generates an externality to the aggregate capital stock.10
For simplicity, we initially assume population is constant and there is no technical
progress. The aid recipient receives a constant flow of aid per capita at each instant,
denoted a(t). In obvious notation, private households are each solving the following
10In the terminology of section 2, this is an amplification effect rather than a virtuous circle,
because it will reduce to a model with a capital externality. Put differently, although there is an
extra state variable in the model at first glance, it can be eliminated from the system of equations,
and the resulting system will then be identical to the case of a capital externality.
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optimal control problem:
max
{c(t)}
∫ ∞
0
u(c(t))e−ρtdt
subject to: ˙k(t) = A(t)Q(t)f (k(t)) + a(t)− c(t)− δk(t)
Q(t) = (Y (t)/L(t))θ
k(0) given.
where k ≡ K/L and a standard transversality condition applies. In what follows,
we suppress the time index except where its inclusion is useful for clarity. Factor
markets are perfectly competitive, and again for simplicity, we can think of the
decision-makers as private households which carry out production and investment.
The households are too small to internalize the effects of their choices on Q, and
hence their intertemporal choices will satisfy the standard Euler equation:
c˙
c
= 1−εu′(c) (A ·Q · fk(k)− (ρ+ δ))
where εu′(c) is the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption, equal
to −σ in the case of isoelastic utility, where 1/σ is the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution.
We assume a Cobb-Douglas production function, so that AQf(k) = AQkβ. Com-
pared to the standard Ramsey model, the steady-state solution and transitional
dynamics are modified because Q is endogenous to aggregate output per capita,
y ≡ Y/L. The assumptions imply:
y = Akβyθ
and hence a reduced-form aggregate relationship:
y = A
1
1−θ k
β
1−θ
Note that the reduced-form output-capital elasticity (the one that might be
estimated by an empirical researcher using aggregate data) is β/(1 − θ), and this
will play a role in what follows. Also note that, to obtain a conventional steady-state,
we need to assume that β < 1− θ, so that social returns to capital are diminishing.
Using the relationship Q = yθ, the private return to capital, used by households
in their intertemporal decisions, is given by:
βA
1
1−θ k
β
1−θ−1
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The steady-state level of k is defined by:
k∗ = A
1
1−β−θ
(
β
ρ+ δ
) 1−θ
1−β−θ
and hence steady-state output per capita is given by:
y∗ = A
1
1−β−θ
(
β
ρ+ δ
) β
1−β−θ
The absolute magnitudes of the elasticities of steady-state output per capita
with respect to TFP and other structural parameters are increasing in θ. We will
use this model to study the relationship between the welfare benefits of aid and
amplification effects. Note that the model reduces to the standard Ramsey model if
θ = 0. Also note that the long-run level of output per capita is independent of the
level of aid, as in Brakman and van Marrewijk (1998) and Obstfeld (1999).11 This
does not mean aid is ineffective, however. Since aid increases the resources available
for consumption and investment, it increases welfare in two ways: it allows faster
convergence to the steady-state, and higher consumption.
4 Simulations
In this section, we first describe the assumptions we use to simulate alternative eco-
nomies. We then study aid in a basic Ramsey model; this analysis is a simple variant
on Obstfeld (1999), but with explicit calculations of welfare effects. Then, we con-
sider how these welfare effects are modified by introducing a capital externality. We
show that this form of amplification does not increase the welfare benefits associ-
ated with aid (relative to a zero-aid counterfactual), and explain the reasons for this
result. In the next section, we will examine whether the result can be overturned
by a model with a medium-run poverty trap.
Our calibration draws on Carter, Postel-Vinay and Temple (2015), including the
choices of the structural parameters. We adopt isoelastic utility with σ = 2 and set
ρ = 0.03, δ = 0.06. Note that σ = 2 corresponds to the mean of the many estimates
compiled by Havranek and others (2015). Again following Carter, Postel-Vinay and
Temple, we construct our aid recipient as an amalgam of low and middle-income
aid recipients, based on World Bank country classifications and taking averages of
11This result does not apply in overlapping generations models; see Eaton (1989) and Dalgaard,
Hansen and Tarp (2004). However, OLG models are less well suited for our purposes, because of
the complexity associated with analysing welfare effects in OLG settings.
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the relevant data from version 6.3 of the Penn World Table (including China and
India). On this basis, the capital-output ratio for our aid recipient is 2.00 and
output per capita is $5790; the model can then be used to infer the value of A.
Across experiments, we assume the donor always has the same relative quantity
of aid to disburse — a sum equivalent to 20% of recipient GDP at time zero. A
constant, exogenous aid transfer of this magnitude is then made in perpetuity.
One point to bear in mind is that, as we vary the assumptions about parameters,
the steady-state level of output will vary. An alternative approach would be to
keep the same steady-state position, and vary the initial conditions. We think our
approach is preferable, because it relates more closely to the decision problem facing
a donor: the donor observes output per capita levels and capital-output ratios in
the data, but will make different calculations about the steady-state growth path,
depending on assumptions about the production technology. Therefore, we calibrate
parameters so that alternative cases match the observed data, and allow the height
of the balanced growth path to vary with β, the output-capital elasticity, and θ, the
strength of the externality.
We emphasize the distance from steady-state because it will play a role in inter-
preting our results. The welfare effects of aid, relative to a zero-aid counterfactual,
depend partly on whether the recipient country would prosper even without aid
(Carter 2014). In the current setting, a country which is a long way below its growth
path is destined to grow especially quickly. For such a country, aid may have a sub-
stantial effect on growth, but the economy would grow quickly in any case. This
mechanism tends to limit the welfare benefits of aid, where the underlying logic is
similar to that in Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006).
To carry out the simulations, we use the relaxation algorithm of Trimborn, Koch
and Steger (2008), ultimately based on a finite-difference method. Their implement-
ation of the algorithm allows the fast and convenient numerical solution of a system
of differential equations, when a solution exists. It can easily handle infinite-horizon
problems, of the type we analyze here. We could have chosen to solve a discrete-time
version of the model using recursive methods, as in the aid study by Carter (2015),
but for our purposes, the relaxation algorithm is faster, and easier to implement.
4.1 The Ramsey model with aid
We start by analyzing aid in the standard Ramsey model, which corresponds to
θ = 0. This simple case will help in understanding our later results: we show that
a higher output-capital elasticity β increases the scope for aid-funded growth, but
does not strengthen the case for aid. We explain the associated reasoning, which
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will extend to our later cases with amplification effects and vicious circles.
Note that a larger β entails a larger marginal product of capital for any given
level of the capital-output ratio. Hence, the larger is β, the greater the impact of
aid-induced investment on the growth rate. In our simulations, when β is larger, the
optimizing household chooses a higher rate of investment as a proportion of output.
Moreover, aid increases the rate of convergence to the steady-state: this is shown in
Figure 1, which plots the factor increase in the convergence rate made possible by
aid.12 Early in the transition, the effect of aid on the convergence rate is especially
marked for high values of β. Thus far, the results are in line with intuition.
Figure 1: Aid and convergence rates for different values of β
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This figure shows the effect of aid on the rate of convergence, defined here as (dy/dt)/(y − y∗),
for five levels of β, the output-capital elasticity. The effect is defined as the factor increase in the
convergence rate made possible by aid. The level of aid is constant, equal to 20% of the recipient’s
initial output, given in perpetuity.
But a more important benchmark is the impact of aid on the welfare of house-
holds. We study this using Hicksian equivalent variation (HEV) as in Gourinchas
and Jeanne (2006) and Carter, Postel-Vinay and Temple (2015). This allows us to
compare lifetime utility with aid to the lifetime utility that would obtain under a
zero-aid baseline scenario. The HEV is the constant proportional change in con-
12Away from steady-state, alternative definitions of convergence rates will typically give different
results. We use the first measure of the four considered by Mathunjwa and Temple (2007).
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sumption at each instant, relative to the baseline, that would generate the same
change in lifetime utility as the scenario of interest. Under isoelastic utility, this is
given by:
λ =
(
Uaid>0
Uaid=0
) 1
1−σ − 1
if σ 6= 1, and λ = exp(ρ · (Uaid>0 − Uaid=0))− 1 if σ = 1.
For example, in our baseline simulation where β = 1/3 and θ = 0, aid equal
to 20% of initial GDP generates the same welfare benefits as raising the original
consumption profile by 21.6%. That is clearly a significant gain. For comparison, it
is the same welfare gain that would be achieved by a sustained step change in total
factor productivity of 16%. At the same time, it is clear from either benchmark —
the HEV gain, and the equivalent TFP change — that aid at this level would fail
to eliminate the welfare differences between rich and poor countries, given the scale
of the international differences in TFP and consumption per capita.13
This raises the question of how the welfare gains vary with parameter assump-
tions. Figure 2 shows that aid has lower welfare benefits, in HEV terms, for higher
values of β. To understand this, consider the prospects for consumption in the ab-
sence of aid. If these prospects are good, then aid will make less difference to welfare
than if the prospects for consumption are less strong. Put differently, when β is high,
aid recipients are less in need of assistance from a lifetime-utility perspective, and
the welfare benefits of aid are diminished accordingly. This shows how consideration
of welfare effects can overturn intuitions that rely solely on growth outcomes, even
in a simple model.
4.2 Amplification effects
We now consider a capital externality, and hence some degree of amplification. This
corresponds to selecting a θ (where 0 < θ < 1 − β), and introduces some extra
complexity. Again, we study growth first. Figure 3 illustrates the effect of aid on
initial growth rates. On the horizontal axis, we vary the reduced-form output-capital
elasticity β/(1 − θ). The dashed line shows growth as a function of β when there
is no externality, so θ = 0. The solid line is based on setting β = 1/3 and plots
growth as a function of the corresponding value of β/(1 − θ), where θ is implicitly
increasing along the x-axis.
13One reason for this result is that aid does not greatly alter the path of the capital stock: in
this baseline simulation, the capital stock with aid is never more than 4% higher, at any given
instant, than in the case without aid.
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Figure 2: The welfare effect of aid as β varies
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This figure shows the welfare benefit from aid, measured by Hicksian equivalent variation, as the
output-capital elasticity varies. The level of aid is constant, equal to 20% of the recipient’s initial
output, given in perpetuity.
We can see how growth responds as the output externality becomes more im-
portant. We find that — as expected — aid has a greater impact on growth for
higher values of θ, but the effect is modest. There are several mechanisms that limit
the size of the effect as the externality becomes more important. First, the effect
working via institutional quality is not internalized by households, which means it
has no direct impact on investment decisions and a limited impact on growth rates.
Second, when we calibrate the model to the observed data, the private marginal
product of capital is lower for higher values of θ. In turn, the investment rate is
lower for all levels of k.
For welfare effects, the corresponding results are shown in Figure 4, again using
the Hicksian equivalent variation. As before, θ is implicitly increasing along the x-
axis of the figure. It is clear from the downward slope of the solid line that the welfare
gains from aid, in HEV terms, are decreasing in the extent of the externality. In other
words, an observer of a given economy could not conclude that the welfare benefits
of aid will be greater with amplification; the reverse is the case. The intuition is that
an economy with a larger amplification effect — with higher θ — has relatively good
consumption prospects in any case. Hence the welfare benefits from aid, relative to
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Figure 3: The growth effect of aid, with and without amplification
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This figure shows the effect of aid on the annualized rate of output growth, measured over the
first four years of the simulation, as the reduced-form output-capital elasticity β/(1 − θ) varies.
The effect on growth is defined as the growth rate with aid, minus the growth rate in the zero-aid
counterfactual. The dashed line sets θ = 0, the solid line sets β = 1/3. The level of aid is constant,
equal to 20% of the recipient’s initial output, given in perpetuity.
a zero-aid benchmark, are less.
A more subtle finding is also evident from Figure 4. The welfare effect of aid
is somewhat greater, for any given value of β/(1− θ), when there is an externality
(θ > 0) compared to when the variation in the reduced-form output-capital elasticity
arises solely from variation in β. In this limited sense, a virtuous circle strengthens
the case for aid. A researcher who knew the reduced-form output-capital elasticity
would infer larger welfare gains when assuming that there is an amplification ef-
fect. When a given reduced-form output-capital elasticity arises partly through an
externality, aid recipients are relatively worse-off in the long run, and hence benefit
more from aid than in the standard (no externality) case.
The relation between the findings and those of Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) is
worth discussing in more detail. They used the Ramsey model to study the welfare
benefits of foreign capital inflows, and showed that the benefits were modest, because
a recipient economy would converge to its steady-state relatively quickly even in the
absence of such flows. Put differently, accelerating convergence to the steady-state
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Figure 4: The welfare effect of aid, with and without amplification
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This figure shows the welfare effect of aid in terms of Hicksian Equivalent Variation, as the reduced-
form output-capital elasticity β/(1 − θ) varies. The dashed line sets θ = 0, the solid line sets
β = 1/3. The level of aid is constant, equal to 20 per cent of the recipient’s initial output, given
in perpetuity.
(as made possible by capital flows) is less valuable than might have been expected.
The same logic extends to aid: we study grants, which are more valuable to the
recipient than loans, but the associated welfare gains remain modest, at least when
set against international differences in consumption per capita. To overcome this
logic, either the recipient economy would need to start a long way below steady-
state, or the rate of convergence — in the absence of transfers — would need to be
much slower.14 In the next section, we will study a model in which convergence is
slow.
In passing, we note that virtuous circles may have wider interest. They help to
rationalize a number of empirical findings: the tendency for countries to converge to
their steady-states at a slow rate, and the sharp contrast between observed trans-
itional dynamics and those of the standard Ramsey model, since the latter typically
generates initial real interest rates and growth rates that are implausibly high. Fur-
ther, when estimated directly from cross-country data, the output-capital elasticity
14Alternatively, as discussed in Obstfeld and Taylor (2004, pp. 262-265), a higher discount rate
could imply larger welfare gains.
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is often found to be higher than the capital share.15 This could be attributed to
endogeneity problems or, as in Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), to the comple-
mentary role of human capital; but amplification effects and virtuous circles provide
an alternative explanation, in which aggregate relationships between output and in-
puts differ from firm-level production functions. Beaudry, Collard and Green (2005)
found that capital accumulation heavily influenced changes in the distribution of
output per worker over 1960-1998, and that the social returns to capital appear to
have increased over time. These patterns could readily arise in a world with virtuous
circles, working through externalities or other means. Such mechanisms can also ra-
tionalize aggregate output-capital elasticities that vary across countries, even with a
common Cobb-Douglas production technology at the firm level. These possibilities
suggest that virtuous circles warrant more research.
5 Vicious and virtuous circles
The analysis thus far might seem counter-intuitive: surely virtuous circles must
strengthen the case for aid? To derive that result, one approach might be to revisit
Rostow’s emphasis on the need for take-off into self-sustained growth (Rostow 1956,
1960). One interpretation is that growth is self-reinforcing, but first an economy
must achieve escape velocity, in order to break out of a vicious circle. Rosenstein-
Rodan (1961) quotes a 1957 MIT report: ‘Launching a country into self-sustaining
growth is a little like getting an airplane off the ground. There is a critical ground
speed which must be passed before the craft can become airborne’.
With this in mind, we modify the Ramsey model so that aid recipients have
Stone-Geary preferences, and may begin a growth process with living standards
close to subsistence. Christiano (1989) refers to this version of the Ramsey model
as the slow convergence model. Although simple, it helps to capture the idea of a
vicious circle: households are too poor to fund investment after meeting consumption
needs, and remain poor because they do not invest. If the economy can be trapped
for some time in a position of low income and low investment, and convergence is
slow, then aid could be especially valuable.
In principle, technical progress will eventually resolve the problem, but the trans-
ition dynamics may be protracted. In this version of the model, the balance of op-
15Examples of high estimates of output-capital elasticities for developing countries include Ben-
habib and Spiegel (1994) and Kim and Lau (1994). Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, pp. 112-118)
explain how the Ramsey model with a low output-capital elasticity generates quantitative pre-
dictions that are at odds with the data; see also King and Rebelo (1993). For a critique of the
empirical relevance of capital externalities, see Benhabib and Jovanovic (1991).
16
posing forces changes. Now, it is especially useful for investment to have a larger
effect on output. This is because a medium-run poverty trap implies good consump-
tion prospects only in the distant future, when capital accumulation and technical
progress have overcome the subsistence constraint. The virtuous circle of rising in-
come and rising investment allows aid to accelerate recipients away from subsistence
consumption more rapidly, without implying a bright near-term future even in the
absence of aid. As a result, aid may be most effective for those recipients where an
amplification effect is present.
The use of Stone-Geary preferences is attractive for another reason: they help to
bring the predictions of the Ramsey model closer to the data.16 Under these pref-
erences, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) is increasing in the level
of consumption, which is consistent with much of the microeconometric literature
on consumption in developed countries: see, in particular, Attanasio and Browning
(1995), Blundell, Browning and Meghir (1994) and Crossley and Low (2011). Con-
sistent with this, Havranek and others (2015) find that, across countries, estimates of
the EIS are positively correlated with GDP per capita. The theoretical importance
of a variable EIS has been emphasized by Bliss (2007, 2008).
With Stone-Geary preferences, utility at each instant is given by:
U(c) = (c− c¯)1−σ /(1− σ)
where the new element c¯ can be interpreted as a subsistence consumption constraint
or, more generally, as a way of ensuring that poor households have a lower EIS.
An economy close to the consumption level c¯ fails to grow, even when the marginal
product of capital is high, because households are too poor to want to sacrifice
consumption. In the pithy formulation of Nurkse (1953), a poor country is poor
because it is poor.
We include a role for technical progress, which renders the subsistence constraint
irrelevant in the long run. If the initial capital stock is sufficiently high, and the
parameter assumptions permit capital intensity to increase despite the subsistence
constraint, the economy will converge to an asymptotic balanced growth path. The
capital-output ratio converges asymptotically to a level which is independent of c¯,
and consumption will always be higher than the subsistence level. Hence, our use of
the terms ‘poverty trap’ and ‘escape velocity’ has been a little loose: the economy
is not trapped indefinitely. Nevertheless, it may take a long time for the economy
16References include Christiano (1989), Rebelo (1992), King and Rebelo (1993), Ben-David
(1998), Kraay and Raddatz (2007), Ohanian, Raffo and Rogerson (2008) and Steger (2009). For a
different model with slow convergence, see Rappaport (2006).
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to achieve significant growth, and in this weaker sense the terms are valid.17
As well as technical progress, we allow a role for population growth, and treat
household utility as weighted by household size at each instant. We can accommod-
ate technical progress and population growth by defining the endogenous variables
in terms of efficiency units; but endogenous institutional quality complicates this.
We assume that institutional quality is a function of output per capita, rather than
output per efficiency unit of labor. This seems the most natural approach, but the
long-run growth rate will now exceed the rate of exogenous technical progress. This
is because our assumptions imply that institutional quality is growing continually
along the balanced growth path.
As before, we start with a production technology and the assumption that insti-
tutional quality depends on GDP per capita:
Y = QKβ(AL)1−β
Q =
(
Y
L
)θ
where we assume that technical progress is labor-augmenting. The easiest way to
analyze this model is to define efficiency unitsX ≡ A 1−β1−β−θ . If we then use y ≡ Y/XL
and k ≡ K/XL to denote quantities in efficiency units, we can derive a reduced-form
relationship between y and k:
y = k
β
1−θ
We use gA to denote the exogenous rate of technical progress. By solving for the
balanced growth path, it can be shown that the long-run growth rate is equal to
the growth rate of X, denoted gX ≡ ((1 − β)/(1 − β − θ)) · gA. Hence, given that
0 < θ < 1 − β, long-run growth exceeds the rate of exogenous technical progress.
Since there is continual improvement in institutions, the effect of technical progress
on long-run growth is magnified. The extent of the magnification is increasing in
both θ and β. We assume throughout that ρ is sufficiently high, and gX sufficiently
low, that lifetime utility is bounded. After solving the household’s optimization
problem and rewriting the system in terms of efficiency units, simulation of the
model is straightforward.
The dependence of the long-run growth rate on the externality parameter (θ)
raises a question for our quantitative exercise. As before, we assume that the donor
is uncertain about the true value of θ, and wants to consider various scenarios. But
17See the longer discussion in Kraay and Raddatz (2007). A wider range of poverty trap models
is discussed in Ghatak (2015).
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now, to study alternative choices for θ, we have to ask whether the donor knows
either the underlying rate of technical progress, or the long-run growth rate. If we
assume the rate of technical progress is known, then varying θ leads to alternative
long-run growth rates, since technical progress is magnified by institutional improve-
ment to varying degrees. Alternatively, we could assume that the donor regards the
long-run growth rate as known, but does not know the rate of technical progress.
We adopt the former choice here, but our result that virtuous circles can modestly
strengthen the case for aid also emerges under the alternative choice, discussed in
an appendix available on request.
The introduction of long-run growth also requires us to specify how aid evolves
over time. We posit the existence of a donor country, not modeled, that gives a
constant proportion of its GDP as aid. This donor has essentially the same economic
structure as the recipient, but with a higher level of productivity, and is on its
balanced growth path throughout. Population growth (n) and long-run growth (gX)
are assumed to be the same in the donor and recipient. As in Carter, Postel-Vinay
and Temple (2015), we set n = 0.015, based on the recent population growth rate
of a set of recipient economies. We again use an initial value of aid equivalent to
20% of recipient GDP at time zero, but now total aid is growing at the same rate
(gX + n) as donor GDP. Although aid is growing, the assumptions imply that aid
per capita will be constant in efficiency units.
We now examine the growth and welfare effects of aid as θ varies, while allowing
the subsistence level of consumption c¯ to vary across experiments. Recall that,
when initial living standards are close to subsistence, the economy can experience
a medium-run poverty trap. The initial level of capital is fixed across experiments
at 11.60. With the rate of depreciation set at δ = 0.06 and initial output per capita
equal to 5.79, the amount of output available for consumption and net investment
is around five units in the absence of aid. Since initial output is treated as known,
we vary the relevance of the subsistence constraint by considering feasible values of
c¯ from zero to 4.50 units. We assume that the rate of exogenous technical progress
is gA = 0.01. The range for θ we consider, from zero to 0.40, implies that the long-
run growth rate varies between 0.01 and 0.025, depending on the value of θ; this
accommodates most conventional estimates of the long-run growth rate.18
We will study outcomes with and without aid, allowing the relevance of the
subsistence constraint to vary. Note that, in Figures 5-10, lines with circle markers
18For example, Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) used an estimate of 2% a year for the long-run
growth rate, and Jones (1995, p. 498) estimated US growth in GDP per capita over 1929-1987 as
1.75%. Note that higher values of θ, as well as raising the long-run growth rate, would bring the
reduced-form production technology closer to linearity, which seems unrealistic.
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Figure 5: Log output per capita (θ = 0)
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This figure shows the effect of aid on the path of log output per capita, for θ = 0, as the level of c¯
varies. In each case the output path is shown without aid (the lower of the paired lines) and with
aid (the upper line of the pair, with circle markers).
will indicate a path with aid, and lines without markers, a path without. When
examining the path of output, we plot the logarithm of output per capita so that
differences in levels are readily discernible, and growth rates can be inferred from
the slopes of the lines.
In Figure 5, for θ = 0, although the recipients will ultimately converge to the
same steady-state growth path, the nature of the transition depends on the initial
proximity to subsistence. In particular, the initial rate of growth is much slower
when initially close to subsistence, and the impact of aid on the output path is
much greater. When an externality is introduced in Figure 6 (θ = 0.30), while
holding β constant, the steady-state growth path is steeper than before, but similar
results apply: when the economy is initially close to subsistence, initial growth is
lower, and aid makes a bigger difference to the path of output.
Figures 7 and 8 study how the output path varies with assumptions about the
externality θ. The strength of the amplification effect determines the level and slope
of the steady-state growth path, which now varies across cases. In Figure 7, where
the subsistence constraint is negligible, the effect of aid on output is too small to
be visible, since households barely alter their investment decisions. In Figure 8, the
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Figure 6: Log output per capita (θ = 0.30)
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This figure shows the effect of aid on the path of log output per capita, for θ = 0.30, as the level
of c¯ varies. In each case the output path is shown without aid (the lower of the paired lines) and
with aid (the upper line of the pair, with circle markers).
economy begins close to subsistence, aid has a stronger effect on the output path,
and this effect is larger for higher values of θ.
To understand the behavior of the model in more detail, Figures 9 and 10 plot
the growth rate of the capital-labor ratio for various cases. These figures show
that, when an economy begins close to subsistence, the growth rate of the capital-
labor ratio is low and may even be negative, because the economy is temporarily
trapped in low income and low investment. Foreign aid promotes faster growth of
the capital stock. When θ is large, the effect of aid on the growth of the capital
stock can be substantial. For example, consider the case where θ = 0.30. We look
at the maximum ratio of the capital stock with aid to that without aid, where the
ratio is computed at each instant. When the subsistence constraint is almost absent
(c¯ = 0.05), the ratio never exceeds 1.03, so the effect of aid on capital accumulation is
modest — the capital stock is never more than 3% higher, at any given instant, than
it would have been without aid. But with a more important subsistence constraint,
the maximum ratio rises to 1.12 (c¯ = 3.00) or 1.40 (c¯ = 4.50). Hence, aid allows
substantially faster accumulation of capital.
As θ increases, aid allows a faster exit from a vicious circle of low income and
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Figure 7: Log output per capita (c¯ = 0.05)
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This figure shows the effect of aid on the path of log output per capita, for c¯ = 0.05, but varying
the strength of the externality indexed by θ. In each case the output path is shown with and
without aid, but aid barely influences the output paths in this case.
low investment. We can use this to reconsider the welfare-based case for aid, again
measured using Hicksian equivalent variation.19 We first look at the case with no
amplification, but a major subsistence constraint (c¯ = 4.50) and β = 1/3. In this
setting, aid leads to a welfare gain equivalent to a 25% consumption increase at each
instant. As before, this is clearly a significant gain, but equally clearly, an order of
magnitude less (at least) than international differences in consumption per capita.
Now consider a case with amplification, θ = 0.30, and hence a faster exit from the
medium-run poverty trap. The welfare gain is then equivalent to a 29% consumption
increase at each instant, which is larger than before, but not dramatically.
As before, amplification has offsetting implications for the welfare derived from
aid. With higher θ, the output gains at short horizons from aid-induced investment
are larger, but at the same time, the recipient’s prospects are relatively good even
in the absence of aid. Figure 11 shows how the welfare effects of aid are related
to amplification, as the relevance of the subsistence constraint varies. It is worth
noting that, since the utility functions differ across the cases — different subsistence
levels are assumed — we should be wary of comparing welfare effects across different
19There is no closed-form expression for this variation in the case of Stone-Geary preferences, so
we obtain it numerically.
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Figure 8: Log output per capita (c¯ = 4.50)
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This figure shows the effect of aid on the path of log output per capita, for c¯ = 4.50, but varying
the strength of the externality indexed by θ. In each case the output path is shown without aid
(the lower of the paired lines) and with aid (the upper line of the pair, with circle markers).
Figure 9: Capital-labor growth (θ = 0)
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This figure shows the growth rate of the capital-labor ratio, with and without aid, for θ = 0 and
varying the relevance of the subsistence constraint c¯.
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Figure 10: Capital-labor growth (θ = 0.30)
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This figure shows the growth rate of the capital-labor ratio, with and without aid, for θ = 0.30
and varying the relevance of the subsistence constraint c¯.
experiments. We are more interested in the slopes of these lines. The figure shows
that, when the recipient is initially close to subsistence or the externality is large,
amplification effects can strengthen the case for aid (the lines are upward sloping).
However, a look at the scale of the y-axis indicates that the slopes of the lines in
the figure are relatively shallow. Amplification only modestly influences the welfare
effects of aid, even when it allows an escape from a medium-run poverty trap.
In summary, the previous section showed that amplification effects may not
strengthen the case for aid; in this section, they can do, by allowing a faster exit from
a vicious circle. This is because, when an economy is caught in a vicious circle, its
medium-run prospects are poor in the absence of aid. This tips the balance of effects
so that the welfare benefits from aid are sometimes higher under amplification; but
the difference made by amplification effects is relatively modest even in this case.
Overall, our results suggest that the poverty trap debate may be less fundamental
than is usually assumed, at least if the poverty trap is eliminated in the long run,
as here.
The relevance of poverty trap models has often been discussed. Bourguignon,
Levin and Rosenblatt (2004) find that, over 1980-2002, about two dozen countries
recorded growth rates that were negative or close to zero. Considering longer spans,
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Figure 11: The welfare effect of aid
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This figure shows how the welfare benefits from aid, expressed as Hicksian equivalent variation,
vary with the extent of the externality and the proximity to subsistence.
however, Easterly (2006) argues that there is little historical evidence for poverty
traps, or for take-offs induced by aid. More recently, Kraay and McKenzie (2014)
argue that many of the mechanisms that give rise to poverty traps are not well
supported in the data. In a study that is partly focused on the Ramsey model with
Stone-Geary preferences, Kraay and Raddatz (2007) find that PPP-adjusted con-
sumption levels vary quite widely across countries in sub-Saharan Africa. This calls
into question the idea of a subsistence constraint which applies to many countries
simultaneously. Nevertheless, they also find that for samples of low-income countries
and sub-Saharan African countries, saving rates are increasing in capital per person,
which is more consistent with the subsistence consumption approach. Sachs (2005,
pp. 56-57) makes a similar point.
We began the paper with a reference to the Marshall Plan, and our results could
seem to contradict the usual view of its importance. We have shown that large-scale
transfers — equal to 20% of initial recipient GDP— have significant welfare benefits,
but not on a scale to make them central to achieving prosperity.20 There are several
20The Marshall Plan did involve large transfers, since the US donated one per cent of its GDP
on average over the years it operated (Crafts, 2013).
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possible interpretations of this result. One is that the significance of the Marshall
Plan may have been overstated by some observers. Another is that definitions of
success vary: they might relate to much wider goals, such as securing the political
stability of postwar Europe.21 Well-designed, large-scale aid programmes can have
benefits which extend beyond their effects on investment and productivity.
Related to this argument, in the models considered in this paper, the potential
effects of aid are sharply circumscribed. Aid makes additional resources available
for consumption and investment, but has no direct effect on productivity. Even the
effect on investment is ultimately limited, because the height of the steady-state
growth path is invariant to aid. It is likely that stronger effects of aid would emerge
in models where aid directly influenced the path of productivity. Virtuous circles
could still play a role, not least in amplifying the effects of a given productivity
increase.
Some commentators regard aid as a catalyst. If aid sparks a moribund economy
into life, the comparison between the growth path and the no-aid benchmark might
be more favourable to aid.22 Hence, a more ambitious theoretical project would
consider alternative models in which aid is a catalyst for growth. There are many
models of multiple equilibria and poverty traps, and some of these suggest a case
for a ‘Big Push’ based on high aid flows; but there are fewer models in which
relatively modest aid flows can prompt a growth take-off. Moreover, the idea of
aid-as-catalyst has barely influenced work which seeks to quantify the effects of aid.
Among the papers in which aid allows exit from a poverty trap, Mourmouras and
Rangazas (2007) is unusual in studying welfare consequences in quantitative terms.
In the empirical literature, the most relevant paper is Dovern and Nunnenkamp
(2007), building on the work of Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2005) on growth
accelerations. Otherwise, a remark of Pronk (2001, pp. 619-620) continues to have
some force: ‘if aid were conceived not as a direct cause of development, nor as its
origin, its source or its prime mover, but only as a catalyst, many studies of the
impact of aid could have been left undone or replaced by less abstract analyses’.
6 Conclusions
This paper has studied whether amplification effects and virtuous circles strengthen
the case for aid. The standard intuition is that they must. But a formal analysis calls
this belief into question: in the neoclassical growth model, an amplification effect
21Gimbel (1976) discusses the wide range of objectives that have been attributed to the Marshall
Plan.
22For an informal discussion of this role for aid, see Rogerson (2011).
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implies good long-term consumption prospects even in the absence of aid. Although
donors can take advantage of virtuous circles, so can other sources of investment,
such as domestic saving. We therefore compare paths with and without aid for
different scenarios. The welfare gains associated with aid are found to be lower
when virtuous circles are present, because virtuous circles will allow the economy to
grow quickly even in the absence of aid.
There are two main qualifications to this result. The first, and least import-
ant, considers the decision problem of a donor with imperfect knowledge. A donor
who knew the reduced-form output-capital elasticity (for example, from empirical
estimates) but not the importance of the externality, would infer larger welfare gains
from aid when assigning the externality a more important role. This is because, for
a given reduced-form output-capital elasticity, an economy with a relatively import-
ant role for the externality has worse consumption prospects. Hence, it will benefit
more from aid transfers.
The second qualification is more important, and emphasizes the role of a take-
off into self-sustained growth. We considered a model with a subsistence level of
consumption, generating a vicious circle of low income and low investment. Aid then
allows this economy to achieve escape velocity earlier in the development process,
especially when the effects of capital accumulation are amplified. The welfare effects
of aid are significant, and sometimes higher under amplification. This implies that
the case for aid is strengthened, in line with intuition. But in the models we consider,
the effect of aid on the capital stock is never large enough to transform a country’s
prospects.
For aid to have stronger effects, alternative models would be needed. One ap-
proach would be to develop models in which aid has a direct effect on productivity,
perhaps in conjunction with mechanisms that amplify a given productivity increase.
Another promising route might be to treat aid as a catalyst, setting a virtuous circle
in motion, for economies otherwise likely to remain at low income levels. It is of-
ten argued informally that aid can unblock a growth process, initiating a transition
away from stagnation or instability and towards sustained development. We have
captured this idea in a simple way using Stone-Geary preferences, but there are
many other possibilities, and only a few have been studied in quantitative terms in
the literature. Further, the implications for empirical work of aid-as-catalyst could
be important, and remain largely uninvestigated.
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